Psychiatry's Problem with Reductionism by Roache, Rebecca
1		
Psychiatry’s problem with reductionism 
Rebecca Roache 
 
Forthcoming in Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology. 
Word count: 7,091 
 
Abstract  Psychiatrists often contrast the biopsychosocial approach to mental illness with 
reductionism. However, what reduction in psychiatry might involve, what it entails for the 
biopsychosocial approach, and what its clinical implications might be, are questions that have 
not been satisfactorily addressed to date. On the contrary, psychiatrists’ discussions of 
reductionism have often obscured these issues. The aims of this paper are to consider some 
such discussions of reductionism, to disentangle and clarify some of the issues discussed, and 
to indicate how psychiatrists—particularly advocates of the biopsychosocial approach—
might apply thought about reductionism usefully and productively. 
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Psychiatry uncomfortably spans biological, psychological, and social perspectives on mental 
illness. As a branch of medicine, psychiatry is under pressure to conform to a biomedical 
model, according to which diseases are characterised primarily in biological terms (e.g. 
genetic influence, molecular changes in the body’s organs, abnormalities detectable via blood 
tests, MRI scans, etc). But psychiatry also draws on the psychotherapeutic tradition, which 
explains mental distress in terms of life experience and social influences.  
These approaches ought to complement each other, but historically this has not 
happened. With no theory creating global, systematic links between the two approaches, 
psychiatry is divided between clinicians who take a psychotherapeutic approach, those who 
take a biomedical approach, and those who subscribe to the uneasy eclecticism of the 
biopsychosocial approach (BPS). The latter generally involves little more than an 
acknowledgement that biological, psychological, and social factors are all relevant to 
understanding mental illness. It has been criticised for failing to specify how mental illnesses 
may be diagnosed and characterised in BPS terms and for failing to provide directions for 
treatment (McLaren 2006; Ghaemi 2009).  
I will argue that BPS’s failure to provide robust guidance for understanding and 
treating mental illness is partly due to a lack of clear thinking about the relationship between 
biological, psychological, and social aspects of mental illness. I will then describe how 
understanding different sorts of reductionism in psychiatry might help advance a BPS 
understanding of the mind. 
I begin, in section 1, by sketching BPS and the relevance to it of reductionism. 
Section 2 outlines some key distinctions between types of reductionism. In section 3 I survey 
psychiatrists’ views on reductionism and argue that these views are confused in various ways, 
and that they impede understanding of mental illness as a result. Section 4 summarises some 
ways in which discussion of reduction in psychiatry has resulted in attention being diverted 
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from the most important issues. I then suggest some directions for further thought on this 
topic in order to help improve BPS as a useful model for research and treatment in 
psychiatry. 
 
The biopsychosocial approach  
The term ‘biopsychosocial’ was coined by Roy Grinker in a 1954 lecture (published 
forty years later: Grinker 1994) but popularised by George Engel, building on the work of 
Adolf Meyer. Engel (1977) drew upon general systems theory—according to which the 
various ‘levels’ of conceptualising illness (biological, psychological, social) form a hierarchy 
with some laws and principles applying only within a level and others applying to the system 
as a whole—to envisage a holistic way of understanding and studying the mind. More 
recently, evidence for interactions between these levels has begun to emerge. For example, 
progress has been made in understanding how the brain changes when we learn (Kandel 
2001); how psychotherapy changes the brain (Gabbard 2000); the link between genotype, 
childhood maltreatment, and adult antisocial behavior (Caspi et al. 2002); and the role of 
oxytocin in post-natal depression and children’s mental health (Apter-Levy et al. 2013).  
However, a BPS model that can guide research and clinical practice requires more 
than evidence of causal links between biological, psychological, and social aspects of mental 
disorder. We need an idea of how these levels relate to each other more generally. Otherwise, 
to quote Nassir Ghaemi, 
 
This eclectic freedom borders on anarchy: one can emphasise the ‘bio’ if one wishes, or 
the ‘psycho’ … or the ‘social’. But there is no rationale why one heads in one direction or 
the other: by going to a restaurant and getting a list of ingredients, rather than a recipe, one 
can put it all together however one likes. This results in the ultimate paradox: free to do 
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whatever one chooses, one enacts one’s own dogmas (conscious or unconscious). (Ghaemi 
2009: 3) 
 
A familiar way of conceptualising the relationship between the biological, the 
psychological, and the social involves reductionism. Indeed, psychiatrists writing about BPS 
often contrast it with reductionism. For discussion of reductionism to be useful, we need to 
know what reduction in psychiatry involves and what its clinical implications are. However, 
psychiatrists’ discussions of reductionism often obscure rather than elucidate these issues. To 
begin to clarify this issue, let us consider how reductionism in psychiatry might be 
understood. 
 
What is reduction in psychiatry? 
Philosophers of science have distinguished several types of reductionism. 
Ontological, methodological, and epistemic reductionism are perhaps the most frequently 
mentioned (Ruse 1989, Sarkar 1992, Bennett and Hacker 2003, Brigandt and Love 2012).  
Ontological reductionism is the view that there is only one type of stuff—physical 
stuff—that figures in biological, psychological, and social accounts of mental illness. It 
entails that, if there were nothing physical in the world, there would ipso facto be nothing 
psychological or social either. Ontological reductionism in psychiatry is a denial of Cartesian 
mind-brain dualism, and is uncontroversial. Indeed, its denial—which amounts to the claim 
that there exists a non-physical mental substance—is highly controversial. 
Methodological reductionism is the view that mental illness is most fruitfully studied 
by focusing on biological phenomena rather than on psychological or social phenomena. A 
methodological reductionist would advocate studying (say) depression by focusing on the 
brain and ignoring psychological and social phenomena like the patient’s feelings and 
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experiences. The conviction that methodological reductionism about mental illness is 
untenable is a chief motivation for BPS. Many important insights about mental illness would 
have been overlooked had researchers focused only on biology. For example, Leff and 
colleagues show that the social environment of people with schizophrenia has a direct effect 
on relapse (Leff et al. 1982), Kendler et al. (2003) show that an individual’s risk of suffering 
from depression is strongly linked to certain experiences, and Caspi et al. (2002) show that a 
certain genotype combined with childhood maltreatment predisposes males to antisocial 
behavior in adulthood.  
Whilst methodological reductionism in science is generally concerned with research 
methodology, psychiatry also involves a treatment methodology. We might, then, distinguish 
two sub-types of methodological reductionism. Research-methodological reductionism was 
described in the previous paragraph. Treatment-methodological reductionism is the view that 
mental illness is always best treated using a biological approach; that is, using methods like 
psychopharmacology, surgery, and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) rather than methods like 
psychotherapy and lifestyle changes. As such, treatment-methodological reductionism is an 
extreme, crude approach. It should be distinguished from the more plausible claim that some 
particular disorder is most effectively treated using biological methods; for example, the view 
that severe, life-threatening depression is best treated with ECT.  
In what follows, I will refer separately to research- and treatment-methodological 
reductionism. I will use the general term ‘methodological reductionism’ to refer to both types 
together. 
Epistemic reductionism is the view that facts expressed in psychosocial terminology 
can be replaced by facts expressed in biological terminology. An example of an epistemically 
reductionist claim in psychiatry is the claim that psychosis is just the occurrence of certain 
sorts of brain events, where ‘just’ implies that once you know all the relevant facts about 
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brain activity, you know all there is to know about psychosis. Epistemic reductionism about 
the mind is unpopular but not unheard of. Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative 
materialism is a form of epistemic reductionism (Churchland 1981, Churchland 1986).  
There are at least two sub-types of epistemic reductionism. Theory reductionism 
involves the claim that one theory (say, psychology) is epistemically reducible to another 
(biology) (Nagel 1949, 1961; Brigandt and Love 2012). Explanatory reductionism is a 
weaker form of epistemic reductionism. It need not be a relation between theories. Instead, 
the relata may be sets of facts or generalisations, or parts of theories (Brigandt and Love 
2012; Waters 1990, 2008). I will distinguish between theory and explanatory reductionism 
only where the views we consider are sufficiently fine-grained to support this distinction. 
Where it is unclear which sub-type is meant, or where distinguishing between them is 
unnecessary, I write simply of epistemic reductionism.  
As a final remark about methodological and epistemic reductionism, the question of 
whether someone is suffering from a mental disorder cannot, at least in our current medical 
framework and on our current understanding of what it is to have a mental disorder, be settled 
without reference to the patient’s experiences and behavior; that is, to psychosocial 
phenomena. Such psychosocial phenomena are a central—if not the most important—aspect 
of clinical data used in psychiatric diagnosis. It is difficult to see how reliance on such data 
might be eliminated without radically reconceptualising current views about mental illness. 
(This observation led Thomas Szasz to conclude that mental illness is a myth (Szasz 1960.) A 
purely biological account of (say) schizophrenia stands or falls depending on how it is 
reflected by clinical data; that is, inter alia, by the patient’s account of his or her experiences 
and/or by his or her behavior. To see this, imagine a biological account of schizophrenia that 
allowed the in-principle possibility of categorising as schizophrenic people who experienced 
none of the usual psychological or behavioral symptoms, or of excluding from its 
7		
categorisation people who experienced those symptoms. We might reasonably deny that such 
an account employs the term ‘schizophrenia’ to refer to the same phenomenon to which 
today’s psychiatrists refer using that term.  
There are, then, at least three forms that reductionism in psychiatry could take. 
Ontological reductionism is widely accepted, whilst methodological and epistemic 
reductionisms are controversial. Whilst reference to reductionism is common in psychiatry, 
adequate delineation and evaluation of different kinds of reductionism are rare. In the next 
section, I review some discussions of reductionism in psychiatry. 
 
Psychiatrists’ views about reduction 
Some academic psychiatrists conflate or confuse different sorts of reductionism, 
obscuring the issues at stake as a result. Others draw approximately the right sort of 
distinctions, but stop short of drawing out the theoretical and clinical implications of their 
views. Let us consider some of these contemporary accounts. 
In 2009, The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry published an editorial and two review 
papers on reductionism. The editorial was by Paul Grof and the reviews by Ian Gold and Joel 
Paris. Grof appears to endorse ontological but not research-methodological or epistemic 
reductionism, although he does not explicitly distinguish the separate types: 
 
Most of my research has unfolded on a reductionist platform, and I share the widespread 
hope that the sciences of the brain will markedly improve the theory and treatment of 
mental illness. … Nevertheless, complex mental phenomena cannot be reduced to minute 
molecular states. Most psychiatric illnesses are complex phenomena, and no single 
approach can sufficiently explain them or the experiences of people who suffer from them. 
(2009: 504)  
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He also indirectly expresses a rejection of treatment-methodological reductionism, 
anticipating with approval that an ‘integrated, interactional, pluralistic approach to psychiatric 
disorders may be coming to life’, in which ‘[i]nvestigating [biopsychosocial] interactions—
being fully invested on the bedside and the bench simultaneously— … may become crucial’ 
(2009: 504). 
Gold takes reductionism in psychiatry to be ontological, epistemic, and perhaps also 
research-methodological:  
 
In a well-known editorial, Insel and Quirion say that ‘mental disorders [should] be 
understood and treated as brain disorders.’ On this conception, reductionism entails that a 
successful theory of mental disorder will be solely, or largely, a biological theory. 
Reductionism has to be thought of in this radical way otherwise it has almost no content. If 
reductionism were merely the view that neuroscience will contribute something to 
understanding the mind, then there could hardly be a need for editorials to make that point. 
Who would need persuading? (2009: 506, citing Insel & Quirion 2005: 2221)  
 
The quoted claim by Insel and Quirion, whose views we will consider presently, 
appears to advocate every type of reductionism introduced in the previous section: 
ontological, epistemic (theory), and methodological (both research and treatment). Gold 
focuses on epistemic reductionism in the second sentence of the passage quoted above, and 
indicates that he takes Insel and Quirion to endorse theory reduction, or at least a wide-
ranging explanatory reduction. He insists that, unless reductionism takes this form, ‘it has 
almost no content’, which he takes to follow from his observation that nobody would need to 
9		
be persuaded of a milder form of reductionism. He confuses content with controversy, 
however. Reductionism can be both informative and widely accepted. 
Paris’s views embody a rejection of epistemic reductionism. He writes,  
 
In time, with the development of more powerful methods, research will no doubt tell us 
more about the relation between the brain and mental illness. However, a discrepancy 
between neuroscience and clinical phenomena is bound to persist because it is rooted in a 
conceptual gap between the mind and the brain. (2009: 515)  
 
However, he goes on to confuse ontological with epistemic reductionism: 
 
The second philosophical issue is the mind-brain problem: whether the mind and thought 
are equivalent to activity in the brain. Most neuroscientists, with only a few exceptions, 
have taken this equivalence for granted. However, if reductionism is wrong, the mind 
cannot be reduced to the brain, and should not be seen as nothing but the effects of 
neuronal activity. The alternative view is that mental processes, expressed in thought, 
emotion, and behaviour, are emergent properties of the brain. They cannot be understood 
in the same way as the sensory and motor processes dealt with by neurology. (515-16)  
 
That ‘the mind and thought are equivalent to activity in the brain’ is a view accepted 
by ‘[m]ost neuroscientists’ suggests—since ontological reductionism is uncontroversial—that 
by ‘equivalent to’ Paris means ‘ontologically reducible to’. He takes this view to be opposed 
to the view that mental processes are ‘emergent properties’ which ‘cannot be understood in 
the same way’ as brain processes. However, the latter view involves a rejection of epistemic 
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reductionism, and is compatible with ontological reductionism. Paris overlooks this 
compatibility by failing to distinguish ontological from epistemic reductionism.  
The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry’s forum on reductionism, then, gives rise to 
some confusing accounts. The contributing authors conflate and equivocate between different 
types of reductionism. Moreover, their discussion mainly focuses on epistemic reductionism, 
and hardly at all on methodological reductionism. In the next two sections, we will consider 
why this is surprising, and how being clear about different sorts of reductionism could help 
facilitate progress in psychiatry.  
Hasse Karlsson and Matti Kamppinen offer another dedicated account of 
reductionism in psychiatry (Karlsson and Kamppinen 1995). They explicitly distinguish 
ontological and epistemic reductionism; further, they identify another form of reductionism—
causal reductionism—that they view as characteristic of the biomedical model. According to 
causal reductionism, neurobiological events (and only such events) cause mental events but 
not vice versa. Causal reductionism is stronger that ontological reductionism but weaker than 
epistemic reductionism. Causal reductionism, as Karlsson and Kamppinen note, implies that 
mental events cannot be affected by psychosocial phenomena. This makes causal 
reductionism, unlike ontological reductionism, inconsistent with BPS. Karlsson and 
Kamppinen follow Mario Bunge in advocating an emergent materialist approach, which 
involves ontological but not epistemic reductionism. 
Despite offering a clear and explicit discussion of reductionism, Karlsson and 
Kamppinen’s endorsement of ontological reductionism and rejection of epistemic 
reductionism do not take us beyond those reached decades earlier by BPS advocates such as 
Grinker and Engel. Further—like Grof, Gold, and Paris—Karlsson and Kamppinen do not 
discuss methodological reductionism, and so they do not consider how their emergent 
materialist views might be applied in research and treatment. 
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Whilst the papers just reviewed address the issue of reductionism directly, the topic 
also arises elsewhere in the psychiatry literature, including in work of particular relevance to 
BPS. Let us consider some such work. 
Eric Kandel claims that all mental states ‘derive from’ brain states. As such, ‘what we 
commonly call mind is a range of functions carried out by the brain’, and ‘all of “nurture” is 
ultimately expressed as “nature”’ (1998: 460). He remarks that this sort of view is 
controversial, and quotes the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences 
(CASBS)—‘probably the country’s premier think tank in the social sciences’ (Kandel 1998: 
460)—objecting to the idea ‘that a living organism’s properties (not only its physical form 
but also its behavioral inclinations, abilities, and life prospects) are material and hence 
reducible to its genes’, and advocating instead ‘some type of radical mind-body dualism in 
which it is assumed that the processes and products of the mind have very little to do with the 
processes and products of the body’ (CASBS 1996, cited at Kandel 1998: 461). Kandel 
responds at length to CASBS’s ‘unease’ about reductionism. 
Kandel’s defence against CASBS’s objection is unnecessary, however, since the 
objection does not apply to his position. He argues for an ontological reduction of mental 
states to brain states, whereas CASBS’s objection—in spirit, if not explicitly—applies to 
epistemic reductionism. By not distinguishing ontological from epistemic reductionism, 
Kandel both overestimates the extent to which his own view is controversial and devotes 
effort to defending his view against an irrelevant objection. 
It is worth remarking on the fact that CASBS’s rejection of epistemic reductionism 
leads it to embrace dualism. Forced to choose between the two, this reaction is 
understandable. However, once we understand that one can endorse ontological reductionism 
while rejecting epistemic reductionism, dualism becomes less appealing.  
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A similar polarisation between a strong form of reductionism and mind-brain dualism 
is described by Glen Gabbard and by Kenneth Kendler. Gabbard observes that 
 
As we contemplate the shape of psychiatry in the 21st century, one of the greatest risks we 
face is reductionism. Specifically, psychiatry is at risk of becoming a house divided 
against itself, with psychosocial specialists in one camp and neuroscientists in another. 
(2000: 117) 
 
Similarly, Kendler sees the field as torn between ‘“hard reductionism” (“all 
psychiatric illness is best explained solely in terms of molecular neuroscience”) and “hard 
emergentism” (e.g., “all psychiatric illness is best explained solely in terms of specified 
mental or social mechanisms and cannot be deduced from biology”)’ (2008: 696). 
Neither Gabbard nor Kendler see this division as clear-cut. Rather, both paint a 
picture of contradiction and confusion in psychiatry. Gabbard comments that ‘[w]hile we 
know that mind and brain are inseparable, our literature and our practice do not always reflect 
that’ (2000: 117), and Kendler remarks that whilst ‘most modern psychiatrists and 
neuroscientists when pressed will deny being dualists … their actions belie their words [and] 
a strong tendency remains for us to emphasize either a mentalistic mind-based or a biological 
brain-based view of illness’ (2012: 378).  
Drawing distinctions between different sorts of reductionism helps clear the waters 
that these comments portray as hopelessly muddy. Gabbard and Kendler’s observations that 
psychiatrists purport not to be dualists can be read as indicating widespread acceptance of 
ontological reductionism, whilst their concern that a dualistic approach emerges in practice 
suggests that psychiatrists often do not view the mind as methodologically or epistemically 
reducible to the brain  
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Both Gabbard and Kendler go on to argue convincingly that the most promising 
approach to psychiatric illness lies in combining biological, psychological, and social 
perspectives. Even so, the sort of polarisation against which they are fighting could be 
resolved by emphasising that psychiatrists need not make the black-or-white choice between 
a strong form of reductionism and dualism. They may, instead, consider whether, how, and to 
what extent the mind is reducible to the brain; and which (if any) non-reductive relations hold 
between the biological, the psychological, and the social. This conceptual scaffolding would 
support the ‘truly integrative treatment strategies’ anticipated by Gabbard and the ‘dappled’ 
explanations of psychiatric illness described by Kendler. An integrative approach is unlikely 
to work in the absence of knowledge of what things are to be integrated and what (causal, 
conceptual, explanatory) relationships exist between them. 
Ghaemi finds much to criticise in the overly eclectic BPS. He contrasts it with 
‘[b]iomedical reductionism (“the medical model”)’ (Ghaemi 2009: 4), which he describes as 
‘dogmatism’. He takes dogmatism to involve treatment-methodological reductionism: 
regarding treatment, ‘[d]ogmatists hold that one method is sufficient’ (2009: 4). By contrast, 
biopsychosocial eclectics [hold] that methods should always be combined’ (2009: 4). Ghaemi 
sees both views as unattractive. Instead, he advocates a ‘method-based psychiatry’ inspired 
by Karl Jaspers:  
 
Rather than advocating one or the other method, Jaspers called for methodological 
consciousness: we need to be aware of what methods we use, their strengths and 
limitations, and why we use them. … Jaspers [believed] that (depending on the condition) 
sometimes one, sometimes another, method is best. (2009: 4) 
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Ghaemi’s view that, according to BPS, treatment ‘methods should always be 
combined’ contrasts with his view less than a page previously, where he complained that the 
‘eclectic freedom’ of BPS ‘borders on anarchy’ (I quoted this complaint in full in section 1). 
Given its lack of guidance about treatment, BPS is compatible with the method-based 
approach advocated by Ghaemi. Indeed, this approach is a good candidate for the sort of 
useful methodological guidance that BPS has historically failed to provide. As a result, the 
very approach that Ghaemi proposes as offering an alternative to BPS may in fact 
complement and strengthen it. 
Ghaemi’s criticism of BPS is fuelled by confusion about different forms of 
reductionism. He associates BPS with ‘additive eclecticism (more is better)’ (2009: 4), by 
which he means ‘truth is achieved by adding more and more perspectives, getting closer and 
closer to a highly complex reality’ (2009: 4). He ascribes this view to Engel and Grinker. 
However, whilst additive eclecticism may capture Grinker and Engel’s view that biological, 
psychological, and social perspectives are all relevant to understanding mental illness, 
Ghaemi is wrong to take either Grinker or Engel to believe that treatment must always 
involve biological, psychological, and social factors. In fact, both Grinker and Engel 
expressed the reverse of this view. Grinker wrote: 
 
I have little use for the pleas to utilize holistic approaches operationally. The scientist has 
to focus, with a particular frame of reference and from a specified position, on a part of the 
world of man. Yet unified or holistic concepts in general are important as organizing 
principles for the understanding of general processes. (Grinker 1966, cited at Ghaemi 
2010: 35)  
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Grinker’s ‘little use’ for ‘pleas to utilize holistic approaches operationally’ suggests 
that he does not insist upon always including biological, psychological, and social factors in 
treatment. His assertion that ‘unified or holistic concepts’ are important in ‘understanding … 
general processes’ indicates that he takes biological, psychological, and social factors to be 
relevant to understanding mental illness.  
Engel’s position is similar. Ghaemi quotes Engel’s claim that ‘all three levels, 
biological, psychological, and social, must be taken into account in every health care task’ 
(Engel 1978: 164, cited at Ghaemi 2009: 3). But this claim appears in the conclusion of an 
argument for conceptualising patients and their conditions in BPS terms (Engel 1978: 161–
62). It does not relate to the treatment methods that one selects. Indeed, Engel remarks that in 
selecting the appropriate treatment for the clinical case discussed in the paper, ‘differences 
between the [biomedical] reductionist and [BPS] systematist temporarily vanish’ (1978: 162), 
with adherents to each approach choosing ‘identical’ treatments. Whilst Engel’s claim 
amounts to a rejection of epistemic and research-methodological reductionism, then, he did 
not advocate that treatment must always include biological, psychological, and social 
elements.  
So far in this section, we have considered some confused views about reductionism in 
psychiatry. Whilst I have not encountered any adequately fine-grained treatment of this issue, 
some writers demonstrate an awareness of some of the distinctions at stake. Such awareness 
is demonstrated by Gabbard and Kendler, both of whose views we considered above.  
Gabbard’s later views about reductionism are clearer than those expressed in his 2000 
paper. Writing with Jerald Kay, he acknowledges that, ‘[w]hat we commonly refer to as 
“mind” can be understood as the activity of the brain’, yet ‘the language of psychology and 
the language of biology involve two different levels of discourse when working with a 
patient. The biopsychosocial psychiatrist must be conceptually bilingual’ (Gabbard and Kay 
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2001: 1959). So, Gabbard and Kay distinguish—albeit not in name—ontological and 
epistemic reductionism.  
Kendler provides a clear and sophisticated defence of the claim that the causes of 
psychiatric conditions are ‘dappled’; that is, ‘distributed widely across multiple categories’ 
(2012: 377) that span all three BPS levels. He recognises a distinction between ontological 
and epistemic reductionism. He notes that since we have first-person knowledge of our own 
minds but only third-person knowledge of other minds,  
 
from the perspective of knowledge—what philosophers call epistemology—the [human 
mind/brain system] has an important first and third person divide. But in terms of what 
exists—what philosophers call ontology—no such discontinuity exists. (2012: 378) 
 
Let us conclude this section by reviewing a 2005 editorial by Thomas Insel and Rémi 
Quirion, which is seen by many as implausibly reductive. Their view that ‘mental disorders 
[should] be understood and treated as brain disorders’ (2005: 2221) is prima facie suggestive 
of ontological, epistemic, research-methodological and treatment-methodological 
reductionism; in other words, all the forms of reductionism considered in this paper. As we 
have seen, Insel and Quirion’s approach—which they term clinical neuroscience—has been 
attacked by Gold. It was also criticised by the philosophers George Graham and Owen 
Flanagan, who argued that without reference to psychosocial phenomena, the existence of 
some mental disorders cannot even be recognised. For example, gambling addiction arises 
when a generally valuable reinforcement schedule operates in certain environments. 
Gambling addiction is not, then, a brain disorder: the brain of a gambling addict ‘is behaving 
as it should from a biological point of view’ (Graham and Flanagan 2013). To conceive it as a 
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disorder, one must consider psychosocial factors, such as the effects of gambling on the 
gambler’s relationships and finances. 
However, Insel and Quirion also acknowledge the limitations of reductionism and 
even express non-reductionist views. For example, whilst advancing a view of ‘mental 
disorders as complex genetic disorders’ (to quote one of their section headings at 2005: 
2221), they emphasise the importance of recognising the ‘limitations of genetics for complex 
illnesses, such as schizophrenia’ (2005: 2221) and comment that ‘it is not clear that genetics 
research will yield a binary diagnostic test for most of the psychiatric disorders. Nevertheless, 
identifying genetic variations associated with disease should provide a gateway into 
pathophysiology’ (2005: 2221). Further, they note that the role of genes in mental illness is 
mediated by ‘the environment, in both a social and physical sense’ (2005: 2221). These 
comments do not themselves reflect epistemically or research-methodologically reductionist 
views; they reflect, rather, a view that a BPS perspective is relevant to a comprehensive 
understanding of mental disorders.  
Insel and Quirion offer, in addition, a clear rejection of treatment-methodological 
reductionism: 
 
The need for a sophisticated understanding of interpersonal relationships along with the 
use of evidence-based, nonpharmacological treatments (from psychoeducation to cognitive 
behavioral treatments) will be the tools of the effective healer in the future as much as in 
the past. Just as the need for rehabilitation following acute care for any serious injury or 
medical illness has been recognized, ideally the psychiatrist will increasingly be part of a 
team that provides culturally valid psychosocial rehabilitation along with medications to 
help those with mental disorders recover and return to a productive and satisfying life. 
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What will be different is having the ability to target these treatments to specific aspects of 
the disease process. (2005: 2223)  
 
This approach to treatment—especially the indication in the final sentence that 
different treatments may be best directed to specific aspects of disorders—resembles the 
method-based approach advocated by Ghaemi. This similarity is particularly evident in 
Ghaemi’s comment that ‘eclecticism is rejected: there are right and wrong methods to use; 
dogmatism is also rejected: the same method is not used for all conditions’ (Ghaemi 2011).  
The views expressed in Insel and Quirion’s editorial culminated eventually in the 
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project under Insel’s leadership at the US National 
Institute of Mental Health. This project increased the emphasis on biology in psychiatric 
research. Whilst welcomed by some, others have been alarmed by what they have seen as its 
overly reductive approach.i A detailed evaluation of RDoC is beyond our scope here, but our 
lesson from our reflections on Insel and Quirion’s views can be as follows. In debating the 
merits of a view that strikes many as overly reductive, being clear about in what respects and 
in what sense the view is reductive is likely to facilitate productive discussion better than is 
arguing about whether the view is too reductive in general. Such clarification could, in 
addition, help identify areas of agreement—as when we compared Insel and Quirion’s 
comments on treatment to Ghaemi’s remarks about the sort of method-based approach that 
we have seen to be consistent with BPS. Clinical neuroscientists and BPS advocates equally 
have much to gain from an analysis of the relationship between the biological, the 
psychological, and the social. 
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Why does clarity about reductionism matter? 
Given that the question of whether and how the mental is reducible to the physical is 
an abstract one, psychiatrists may wish to know how thinking about reductionism can help 
further the aim of improving the lives of people suffering from mental distress. What 
advances in psychiatry might we hope for following from clearer thinking about reductionism 
in psychiatry? 
Broadly, the answer to this question is that clearer thinking about the relationship—
reductive or otherwise—between mind and brain can help psychiatrists work out where best 
to focus their efforts in order to achieve their aims more effectively. Most obviously, if the 
ultimate aim of psychiatry is to relieve mental suffering, then we might expect psychiatrists’ 
theorising about reductionism to focus primarily on treatment- and research-methodological 
reductionism. This is because working through issues in these areas aims at making progress 
clinically: at developing treatments, and at making insights into research methods intended to 
lead ultimately to developing treatments. Our analysis of various psychiatrists’ accounts of 
reductionism reveals that very little of their work focuses on methodological reductionism. 
For any psychiatrist whose interest in reductionism is motivated primarily by a desire to bring 
about improvements in patients’ symptoms, this looks like misdirected effort. But this 
concern comes to light only after reflecting on the various sorts of reductionism that apply to 
psychiatry. 
It would be too strong to claim that psychiatrists interested in reductionism should 
concern themselves only with methodological reductionism, however. The focus of much 
discussion in psychiatry is broader than questions of methodology in research and treatment. 
Much work in psychiatry focuses instead on understanding what sort of thing mental illness 
is, and how it and the experiences of patients can best be conceptualised and described. This 
work informs clinical insights about how to research and ultimately relieve mental suffering, 
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but its immediate intended outcome is increasing understanding rather than producing 
advances in research and treatment methods. Answering questions relating to ontological and 
epistemic reductionism helps further this understanding, and grasping the differences 
between ontological and epistemic reductionisms is an important step along the way. 
In the next section, we will look in greater detail at how confusion about reductionism 
can present an obstacle to progress in psychiatry. 
 
Reductionism in psychiatry: the real issues 
This incomplete review of discussions of reductionism in psychiatry highlights 
several ways in which the task of assessing how biological, psychological, and social 
contributions to mental illness combine and relate is confounded by inadequately clear 
thought about reductionism. Let us summarise some of the ways in which this happens. 
i. By not distinguishing different types of reductionism, reductionism may be viewed as 
overly strong. Most commonly, reductionism is assumed to involve epistemic 
reductionism. 
ii. Those who view reductionism as implausibly strong sometimes respond by embracing a 
contrasting but equally implausible position, like dualism.  
iii. Failure to distinguish different types of reductionism results in a focus on the wrong 
reductionist issues. In particular, methodological reductionism is neglected, despite being 
the type of reductionism most directly relevant to psychiatry. 
iv. Conflating or equivocating between different types of reductionism can make sensible 
views about psychiatry appear implausible. This often happens when psychiatrists 
implicitly endorse ontological but not epistemic reductionism. 
v. Failure to distinguish types of reductionism can lead psychiatrists to overlook similarities 
between views, and possibly to miss opportunities to unite in a common cause as a result.  
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Progress could be made towards a BPS account of mental illness if BPS advocates 
were to set out which sorts of biological, psychological, and social properties are relevant to 
understanding mental illness. This would facilitate a clearer picture of the relationships—
including reductive relationships—that hold between the properties in question, which in turn 
will enable improved understanding of how the BPS levels are best combined to understand 
and treat mental illness. This is a conceptual task, but it can draw on existing empirical work 
to identify causal relationships between biological, psychological, and social aspects of 
mental illness. That this detail is currently lacking is illustrated by the fact that discussions of 
BPS tend not to draw a threefold distinction between the three levels; instead, they draw a 
twofold distinction between the biological and the psychosocial. This disguises the fact that 
the social is the least adequately defined of the three levels. It is unclear whether it should be 
defined narrowly so as to correspond, for example, to sociology; or whether it should be 
viewed more broadly as encompassing insights from various social sciences and perhaps also 
‘folk’ ideas about health and illness. 
Ghaemi criticises BPS for failing to define its terms adequately. He argues that it 
depends upon an implausibly narrow conception of biology: 
 
In this tradition, derived from positivism, the environment and personal experience is 
excluded, and biology is identified with genes and cells and molecules, conceived in 
isolation. Current views of biology and disease are much more broad, incorporating 
interactions of genetics and environment into the very definition of the biological. Perhaps 
Engel meant to promote this approach with the BPS label, but it could simply be called a 
biological model, properly conceived. (Ghaemi 2011)  
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Ghaemi also argues that ‘psychological’ and ‘social’ are not clearly defined; 
consequently, BPS ‘can be stretched in any direction’ (Ghaemi 2011), enabling any given 
illness to be deemed biopsychosocial. 
Ghaemi implies that BPS advocates must clarify what in general is meant by the 
biological, the psychological, and the social. Since not all biological, psychological, and 
social properties are relevant to mental illness, this is unnecessary. BPS advocates may focus 
on a relevant sub-set of those categories.  
What the relevant properties are will determine what sort of theory BPS is. As science 
advances, some of today’s psychological and social properties may come to be encompassed 
by biology. If all relevant psychosocial properties are ultimately encompassed by a future 
biology, then BPS will become obsolete: it would be superseded by a (new, broader) 
biological approach. Since it is an empirical matter how the field of biology might develop in 
the future, it is an empirical matter whether certain current psychosocial properties will one 
day count as biological.ii And since, in that event, those once-psychosocial properties would 
be comprehensively (if trivially) reducible to biology, it might be that Gold is correct to claim 
that it is an empirical matter whether reduction in psychiatry will be successful. 
 
Conclusion 
Specifying how our conscious experience arises from a biological substrate is 
arguably philosophy’s most intractable problem. Yet whilst, at the most fundamental level, 
nobody fully understands how we come to have conscious experiences, we look to 
psychiatrists to fix us when our ability to produce normal experiences goes wrong—when, for 
example, we become depressed or psychotic. Psychiatrists, then, must find practical solutions 
in an area where the most fundamental conceptual questions remain unanswered. In the 
absence of such answers, psychiatrists need the conceptual tools necessary to make the best 
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use of existing knowledge about the mind and its ailments. In particular, they need the 
conceptual tools necessary to compare and combine biological, psychological, and social 
accounts of mental illness. An understanding of the various forms of reductionism in 
psychiatry forms an important set of these tools. 
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i	For	a	flavour	of	the	range	of	reactions	to	RDoC,	see	World	Psychiatry’s	2014	forum	on	RDoC,	in	which	a	paper	authored	by	Bruce	Cuthbert—who	led	the	RDoC	project—is	accompanied	by	twelve	commentaries	(Cuthbert	2014).	
ii	This	uncertainty	about	what	a	future	biology	will	look	like	makes	any	claims	about	whether	or	not	all	mental	illness	can	ultimately	be	conceived	in	purely	biological	terms	vulnerable	to	a	problem	analogous	to	that	described	by	Carl	Hempel	in	what	has	come	to	be	known	as	‘Hempel’s	Dilemma’.	See	Hempel	1970;	Crane	and	Mellor	1990.	
																																																								
